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Ghosh: Razing the Funhouse?

RAZING THE FUNHOUSE?
Shubha Ghosh ∗
Whether as a scholar or just an ordinary thoughtful person, one
cannot completely ignore history. At the same time, the past is
annoying, used to promote a whole host of agendas in the guise of
tradition, legitimacy, respect. Michael Risch’s engaging and just plain
fun article looks at America’s First Patents and asks about the relevance
of history to law. 1
The engagement with history might seem particularly irrelevant for
the field of intellectual property with its concern for the new, new thing
and for progress. Why should the past matter? As Professor Risch
shows, while intellectual property policy is concerned with the future,
understanding its moorings in the past provides perspective on how to
shape intellectual property law. 2 Progress is as much about cumulative
creation as it is about erasure. Of course, as with much legal
argumentation, one needs to sift and winnow through the record and
separate rhetoric from insight. I think that is Professor Risch’s primary
goal in his examination of the first patents. Judges appeal to history in
deciding contemporary patent cases, but it seems that they use the
purported historical record in a purely instrumental way. Like any good
scholar, Professor Risch shows us that the reality is more complicated
than what we take to be historical fact.
Although he may have overstated the claim, George Santayana
struck a kernel of truth in observing that forgetting history results in
reliving it over and over. 3 Avoiding that eternal recurrence is to
recognize the study of history as a sort of travel, an engagement in
comparative thinking. To study history is to travel to a different mindset
and understand the local customs and ways of living. Those
experiences, if sufficiently deep and genuine, can be beneficial. History
is a series of experiments, some successful, most failed. The problem is
that history by itself does not give us a metric to gauge what is success
and what is failure. That’s why originalism as a mode of interpretation
and as a basis for legal policy cannot really take us anywhere. It is not
much of a trip if your roadmap and compass are centuries old.
The mismatch between historical method and normative signposts is
ultimately what I found unsatisfying about Professor Risch’s article. By
analyzing America’s first patents, the article engages in originalism of
sorts. But the point is to show how complex the historical record is.
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Vilas Research Fellow & Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2012).
See id.
See 1 GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason in Common Sense, in THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE
PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284 (2d ed. 1922) (“Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.”).
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Justice Stevens is that target here, especially his assertion that, as a
historical matter, patentable subject matter with respect to processes
was quite narrow. 4 Professor Risch looks not just at the case law, but
also at the practices of patenting showing something more ambiguous
than what Justice Stevens asserts. 5 For example, business methods were
patented in the Nineteenth Century. 6 One can question whether
Professor Risch might have too generous a definition of business
methods, but nonetheless his basic point strikes me as correct. There
was no clear prohibition against business method patents, and from the
perspective of practice, what could be the subject of patents is broader
than Justice Stevens lets on. 7
The problem is that facts do not by themselves tell us what to do.
Caution should inform the engagement with fact. By looking at the
period up to 1836, when the patent system in the United States was
structured as a registration system with no administrative review,
Professor Risch examines a period when anything goes. 8 Of course, he
does extend the analysis to three years after the regime change towards
an administrative system. 9 The point, however, remains is that when
there is a fundamental change from an open registration system to a
regulated administrative one for determining who gets patents, there is a
problem of commensurability.
In part, the United States rejected the registration system for patents
because of the unpredictability it introduced. 10 Identifying ownership
was confounding; questionable inventions were protected by federal
law. These concerns might sound familiar because they are raised with
respect to the copyright system today. I was a bit lost as to what the
historical record under the registration system would imply for patent
administration. Both Justice Stevens and Professor Risch might be
wrong about patentable subject matter because the change in regime
tells us nothing about what patentable subject matter should be.
Business method patents seem to be Professor Risch’s primary
concern in the contemporary debate over the scope of patentable
processes. 11 But a business method is only one type of process at issue.
Perhaps more salient is the patentability of medical diagnostic and
treatment methods. The Supreme Court addressed medical methods in
its 2012 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
4.
(1978)).
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See Risch, supra note 1, at 1326–37 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596
Id. at 1320–25.
Id. at 1320–21.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1281–82.
Id. at 1282.
See id. at 1282 & n.12.
See Risch, supra note 1, at 1328, 1334.
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decision. 12 Professor Risch identifies many early patents covering
medicines, but only a few are what I would call medical method
patents. 13 What should we make of that? One view might be that
medical methods are not historically recognized. Of course, that ignores
technological developments in the past fifty years that would make the
patentability of medical methods a relevant question. Professor Risch
would say that history weighs in favor of broad subject matter to
accommodate changes in technology. I think that is basically right, but I
do not think history tells us anything here about the range of ethical and
policy concerns raised by medical methods. For example, how do
medical method patents affect the treatment of patients? Do patents on
medical diagnostics actually lead to progress in the field? History aids
in answering these questions by offering context. But by itself history is
largely silent on how to move forward.
We need to step outside of the funhouse of history and ask what we
find so entertaining. Professor Risch demonstrates how appeal to history
can be misdirected. He takes us out of the funhouse by showing us that
it has far more rooms than we imagined. But one still has to wonder
what the rest of the neighborhood looks like.

12. No. 10-1150 at 3 (Mar. 20, 2012).
13. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1312, 1316, 1317.
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